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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Equal Protection-INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS-RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-RECOUPMENT
ABLE

To

OF DEFENSE COSTS FROM THOSE FOUND

PAY AFTER SENTENCING

Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)
Among the most important achievements of the United States
Supreme Court in the last two decades has been its success in
making meaningful to indigent state court defendants the sixth
amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions.' Credit for this achievement must not be bestowed
upon the Supreme Court alone, for its mandate would have gone
unfulfilled had it not been for the states' responsiveness in organiz2

ing appointed counsel and public defender systems.
Like all large-scale governmental ventures, defense programs
are costly. 3 In a time of heightening fiscal burdens, it is only
natural that many states have established plans to recoup their
expenditures from tbose indigent defendants who later become
solvent.4 In Fuller v. Oregon,5 the Supreme Court upheld against
challenge on sixth amendment and equal protection grounds Ore' When used with respect to the right to appointed counsel, "indigent" refers to a
defendant who cannot afford to pay for defense against the prosecution's charges. Thus,
indigency turns not only on the defendant's resources, but also on the fee schedule of local
defense attorneys for the type of case involved. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 53

(1967).
2 For a comprehensive study of state appointed counsel and public defender systems
see 2-3 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE

COURTS (1965).
3 Comprehensive statistics on the cost of defending the indigent tend not to be of recent origin, but they do give a sense of the magnitude of the effort demanded. In the last ten
months of fiscal year 1966, counsel were appointed f6r 38% of the federal court defendants
against whom criminal charges were brought. With 80% of the attorneys already paid,
disbursements totaled $1,649,045, or an average of $131 per defendant. D. OAKS, THE
CRIMINALJUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 5-6 (1969). In 1965 the number of
indigent felony defendants in state courts was estimated to be 150,000 per year. Using 1962
rates for assigned counsel the total cost of nation-wide representation was estimated as at
least $25 million per year. 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 7, 10.
4 Provisions for recoupment of various kinds of state-bestowed henefits from recipients
who later acquire assets are not uncommon. For example, in Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp.
853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 323 (1969), a three-judge district court upheld the
New York public assistance recoupment statute. A vigorous dissenting opinion was filed in
that case by judge Kaufman. 281 F. Supp. at 869.
5 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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gon's carefully-tailored recoupment statute. 6 This Note will analyze, in terms of important sixth amendment and equal protection
precedent, the Court's disposition of the arguments which were
before it in Fuller. From the perspective of the Fuller holding, it will
then sketch the currently prevailing approach of the Supreme
Court in right to counsel cases.

GENEALOGY OF THE ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COURT

IN Fuller v. Oregon

In the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,' the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of an indigent defendant for whom
a Florida court had refused to appoint counsel. Florida law at the
time provided for appointment of counsel only in capital cases, and
Gideon was charged with a noncapital felony. 8 Although the assistance of counsel clause 9 had much earlier been construed to mean
that indigent criminal defendants in federal courts were entitled to
appointed counsel, 10 prior to Gideon the same right had been
extended to state court 2 defendants only in capital cases" or in
"special circumstances."' In Gideon, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Black, unequivocally declared that the right of indigent
criminal defendants to appointed counsel is a fundamental right
6 ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 161.665-.685 (1973).
The Supreme Court's tolerant attitude toward defense cost recoupment statutes derives
in part from the Justices' recognition that they themselves are responsible for imposing on
the states the burden of defending the indigent. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141
(1972).
7 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 Id. at 337.
9 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. One authority explains:
History leaves no doubt that the assistance of counsel clause was aimed at the
practice that had grown up in England, whereby defendants charged with felonies
other than treason could not have the aid of retained counsel at their trials with
respect to issues of fact. ... [N]o one was tbinking of the assignment of counsel,
although some colonies did have statutes providing for their appointment in certain
types of trials.
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 943-44
(1965) (footnotes omitted).
10Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). These "special circumstances" have been found
where there was danger of prejudice because of a codefendant's guilty plea, Hudson v.
North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); where a youthful defendant was kept ignorant of his
rights, DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); and where the charge involved
complex legal issues, Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
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essential to a fair trial. 3 As such, the right is enforceable against
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 4 Since Gideon, the right to appointed counsel has
been held to be fundamental in all but a few classes of cases' 5 and
16
in most stages of prosecution.
In remedying the untoward influences of poverty on the
criminal justice system, the Gideon-due process line of cases has
been complemented by a line of equal protection cases of earlier
origin. In Griffin v. Illinois,17 the Supreme Court held that a state
may not deny an indigent the right to appellate review of his
conviction simply because his indigency makes it impossible for
him to purchase a required trial transcript. Writing for a fourJustice plurality, Justice Black identified as "the central aim of our
entire judicial system" the sweeping principle that "all people
charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on
an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' "18
The Court first applied this principle to the right to appointed
counsel in Douglas v. California,19 where it was held that a state may
not condition appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant
making a first appeal of right upon a preliminary finding that
counsel would be of some value to the defendant or the court. The
Supreme Court concluded that requiring indigent defendants seeking counsel to have the merits of their cases prejudged amounted
13 372 U.S. at 342-45. Studies have indicated that the need for appointed counsel is no
less important where the defendant chooses to plead guilty rather than go to trial:
[T]he great majority of unrepresented defendants pleaded guilty, and most other
cases were terminated by dismissals. Only a few cases went to trial. Of those who
pleaded guilty, the overwhelming majority pleaded to the principal offense rather
than to a lesser offense. This suggests the possibility that a defendant without
counsel is in a poor position to bargain with the prosecutor for a plea to a lesser
offense.
1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 91-93.
14 372 U.S. at 340-41.

15 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court held that appointed counsel
must be made available whenever the defendant faces possible imprisonment of any
duration. The Court apparently has not reached as yet the issue of the right to appointed
counsel in trials for petty or misdemeanor offenses where imprisonment is not a possibility.
16 Among the "critical stages" to which the sixth amendment guarantee has been held
to apply are preliminary hearings prior to indictment, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970); post-indictment lineups, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); and secret
interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Counsel must be provided for
convicts at parole and probation revocation proceedings, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967), and the first appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

18 Id. at 17, quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)1.
19 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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to the kind of "discrimination against the indigent" prohibited by
20
Griffin.
Surprisingly, there has been little interplay between the
Gideon-due process and the Douglas-equal protection lines of cases.
As a rule, the Supreme Court has employed due process analysis in
dealing with practices which totally deprived indigent defendants
of the right to appointed counsel. 21 It has employed equal protection analysis where challenged practices amounted only to arguable
22
infringement-i.e., partial deprivation-of this right.
The Supreme Court's failure to bring the rationale of the
Gideon-due process line of cases to bear on infringement fact
situations means that it has not treated the right to counsel,
unquestionably fundamental for due process purposes, as likewise
fundamental for equal protection purposes. The Court's use of
equal protection principles in right to appointed counsel cases has
taken the form of traditional, two-pronged equal protection
analysis: the Court has sought to determine (1) whether the challenged classification bears a rational relation to a legitimate state
objective and (2) whether the serving of the state objective out20

Id. at 355.

See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
The reason for the existence of two lines of analysis in the right to counsel area has not
been satisfactorily explained. Prior to Gideon, it was expected that any overruling of the
"special circumstances" rule propounded in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), would be
accomplished on equal protection grounds. Indeed, Justice Black in his Betts dissent (316
U.S. at 474) had already advanced what one writer calls "the notion ... that equal protection
of the law demanded equipping impoverished defendants with counsel." Dowling, Escobedo
andBeyond: The Needfor a FourteenthAmendment Code of CriminalProcedure,56 J. CRIM. L.C. &
21
22

P.S. 143, 150 (1965).
Professor Dowling supports the view that "the new look on the sixth amendment came
via the due process clause of the fourteenth" because "due process of law is a more regulable
doctrine than equal protection; it can be cut off where the a priori deductions of equal
*protection cannot." Id. at 150.
Professor Israel recoguizes that an equal protection case overruling Betts might bave
lacked "limiting principles," but he concludes that the Court did not ensure a "regulable
doctrine" in right to counsel cases by deciding Gideon the way it did because on the very same
day that it decided Gideon, the Court in Douglas
found no difference between the state's refusal to give the indigent a transcript in
Griffin and its refusal to provide counsel on appeal.... Once the Court has found
that Griffin requires equality in the quality as well as the right of appeal, it
necessarily follows that the same type of equality is required at the trial level. As
[dissenting Justice Harlan] in Douglas noted, the Coures decision in that case made
the Gideon analysis of the right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause
"wholly unnecessary."
Israel, Gideon v. wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. RFv. 211, 247-48
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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weighs any harm caused by the classification.2 3 The appropriateness of the use of traditional equal protection analysis in right to
appointed counsel cases is questionable, however, since in recent
years the Court has used a more stringent test where provisions
affecting fundamental rights or creating suspect classifications have
been involved. 4 Such provisions have been analyzed with strict
scrutiny and have been upheld only where found to serve compel25
ling state interests.
A second and related result of the Supreme Court's failure to
emphasize the fundamental nature of the right to counsel in
dealing with infringement cases has been its refusal to apply the
doctrine of "unconstitutional chill" in such cases.26 Briefly stated,
the chill doctrine holds unconstitutional those laws which, while not
denying fundamental rights, unnecessarily discourage the exercise
of such rights. The doctrine, which is not often utilized by the
Supreme Court,2 7 was first outlined in detail in United States .v.
23 In an excellent overview of the Court's use of equal protection principles in the area

of indigent defendants' rights, a student writer makes the following comments about the
Coures use of a "traditional" test involving a "balancing" coinponent:
[AlIthough the majority opinion was void of any discussion of what "test" was being
used, Griffin seems to have found that the interests of a state in conserving its funds
are far outweighed by the harm of depriving an indigent of an appeal. Likewise, in
Douglas the inequality between "rich" and "poor" that results when the latter is not
furnished counsel on his first appeal as of right, was found to be "a discrimination
at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin .... " More illustrative of the
rationale employed in reaching the result in Douglas is its limitation to first appeal.
The implication is that appeals and collateral proceedings at other levels might not
survive the weight of the economic considerations of the state. Indeed, the Court
carefully established that "absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are
drawn and we often sustain them."
Comment, New Vistas in Protectingthe Indigent. Rewriting Griffin and Douglas, 4 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 485, 500-01 (1970) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
24 One such classification, long held suspect for obvious reason, is race. See Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
25 But "the Griffin-Douglas rationale has yet to be applied to the full extent required by
Comment, supra note 23, at 503 (emphasis in
current equal protection standards .
original). The writer continues:
Applying this more stringent test that has evolved since Griffin and Douglas and
their progeny, it is dubious whether the limitations placed on their holdings would
still be upheld today. For example, the Douglas limitation of the right of an indigent
to be furnished with council [sic] only on the first appeal granted as a matter of right
appears to be the results [sic] of the Court's considering subsequent appeals or
collateral attacks less meritorious than first appeals as of right when balanced against
the state interest of monetary conservation. However, in view of the compelling
interest standard that appears to he required, a mere showing that appointment of
counsel at different judicial levels would be relatively costly to the state, would not
seem to absolve that body from that responsibility.
Id. at 502 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). But see text accompanying note 107 infra.
2' See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
27 Application of the chill doctrine has generally been limited to cases in which state or
local governments have attempted to condition the contintuation of public employment
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Jackson.2 8 In that case the Court struck down a provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act2 9 which provided for imposition of the
death penalty only in cases tried before a jury, thus forcing the
defendant who exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial to
do so at the risk of his life. Because other means of assuring that
the death penalty is never imposed unless the case has been tried
before a jury were clearly available, the Court invalidated the
Kidnapping Aces accomplishing that purpose by conditioning the
30
right to a jury trial.
A case which confirms some of the above observations about
the Court's approach in cases involving the rights of indigent
criminal defendants is Rinaldi v. Yeager. 31 A New Jersey statute
enacted in the wake of Griffin required prisoners who perfected
unsuccessful appeals to repay the state out of their prison pay for
the cost of transcripts required in preparing their appeals. 3 2 Writ-

ing for the Court, Justice Stewart refused to reach petitioner's
argument that the statute discouraged him from exercising-i.e.,
chilled-the "indigent's freedom to appeal" purportedly guaranteed by Griffin.3 3 Instead, the case was disposed of on the narrower
basis that "no defensible interest" in the legitimate end of recoupment was served by requiring repayment from prisoners, but not
from other classes of unsuccessful indigent appellants, such as
3 4
those given suspended sentences, fines, or probation.
In oft-cited dicta, the Rinaldi Court emphasized that "a legislature could validly provide for replenishing a county treasury from
the pockets of those who have directly benefited from county
expenditures.1 35 By the time the Court first dealt with a defense
upon waiver of constitutional rights. See Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Comm'r, 392 U.S.
280 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
28 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
29 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
30 390 U.S. at 581-83. "In some States, for example, the choice between life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to ajury in every case-regardless of how the defendant's
guilt is determined." Id. at 582 (emphasis in original).
31 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:152-18 (Cum. Supp. 1964).
33 384 U.S. at 307.
34 Id. at 309. A decision on chill grounds would have cast doubt on the states' ability to
place any condition at all on exercise of the indigent's rights. Equal protection seems to have
been a "narrower" ground of decision because, as Justice Jackson once wrote, invalidation of
state action on equal protection grounds "does not disable any governmental hody from
dealing with the subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must
have a broader impact." Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(concurring opinion).
35 384 U.S. at 309.
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cost recoupment statute in James v. Strange,3 6 a variety of such
statutes were in force in nearly a third of the states. 37 On the
federal level, Congress had made provision in the Criminal Justice
Act of 196438 for recoupment from federal court defendants with
available funds.3 9 Moreover, some state courts made a practice, in
the absence of any specific recoupment statute,40 of ordering
41
repayment as a condition of probation.
36 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
37 A number of the statutes in effect at the time of the Strange decision are cited in the
Court's opinion. Id. at 133 n.8. A New Hampshire recoupment provision was declared
violative of that state's constitution in Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500
(1969).
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(a)-A(i) (1970).
39 The federal provision reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Whenever the United States magistrate or the court finds that funds are available
for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may
authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the bar
association or legal aid agency or community defender organization which provided
the appointed attorney . . . or to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a
reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the time of payment, to carry out
the provisions of this section.
Id. § 3006A(f). The Criminal Justice Act is a comprehensive plan to provide representation
and other services to federal criminal defendants otherwise unable to obtain an adequate
defense. Although § 3006A(f) is often called a recoupment provision, its primary purpose is
not to recover past expenditures, but to compel a defendant who is "marginally eligible"
under the Act to pay part of the costs of his defense, presumably in advance. See COMMITE
TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964, REPORT, 36 F.R.D. 277, 290 (1965);
Oaks, Improving the CriminalJustice Act, 55 A.B.AJ. 217, 219 (1969). But see United States v.
Durka, 490 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1973) (repayment ordered from defendant found financially
able to make repayment within reasonable time of his acquittal).
40 Although courts have no implied or inherent power to award costs in either civil or
criminal cases, state statutes provide for the award of costs in a wide range of situations. See,
e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 8101-10 (McKinney 1963).
41 The leading case attacking this practice is In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143,
78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969). The California Supreme Court declared such conditioning of
probation an impediment to the free exercise of sixth amendment rights, even where
procedural safeguards are employed:
[W]e believe that as knowledge of this practice has grown and continues to grow
many indigent defendants will come to realize that the judge's offer to supply
counsel is not the gratuitous offer of assistance that it might appear to be; that, in
the event the case results in a grant of probation, one of the conditions might well
be the reimbursement of the county for the expense involved. This knowledge is
quite likely to deter or discourage many defendants from accepting the offer of
counsel despite the gravity of the need for such representation as emphasized by
the court in Gideon [v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)].
71 Cal. 2d at 391, 455 P.2d at 144, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 208. "Miranda[v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
491 (1966)] made clear that where 'rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can
be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.'" 71 Cal. 2d at 393, 455 P.2d
at 146, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
The California court's approach was rejected in State v. Foust, 13 N.C. App. 382, 185
S.E.2d 718 (1972), overruled on other grounds, State v. Young, 21 N.C. App. 316, 204 S.E.2d
188 (1974). Allen was followed in State v. Eide, 83 Wash. 2d 676, 521 P.2d 706 (1974),
perhaps the last pre-Fuller recoupment case in the high courts of the states.
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Strange involved a Kansas statute which required indigent criminal defendants to reimburse the state for expenditures made in
providing them with counsel and other defense services. 42 If a defendant defaulted on his obligation, the debt was entered on the docket
as ajudgment against him.43 Furthermore, with the exception of the
homestead exemption," all of the exemptions normally afforded
civil judgment debtors in Kansas were denied to a defendant indebted to the state under the recoupment statute.4 5
In a forceful opinion, a three-judge federal district court
unanimously struck down the Kansas recoupment statute. 4 6 When
Strange reached the Supreme Court, the Justices, not surprisingly
in light of Rinaldi, refused to rule on whether the statute had a
chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appointed counsel. 47 The ruling of the court below was affirmed on the narrower
ground that the statute was violative of equal protection. In his
opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell focused on the
statute's unequal treatment of indigent criminal defendants as
compared with other civil judgment debtors. 8 Under Kansas law,
one in debt to an attorney whom he had retained could not be
threatened with unrestricted garnishment or attachment should he
fail to pay his bill, while one in debt to the state for the services of
his appointed attorney could be so threatened. 49 Citing Rinaldi for
42

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4513 (Supp. 1971). The statute provided for notice to the

defendant of the amount owed within 30 days of disposition of his case. He was given 60
days in which to make repayment. Interest accrued on the debt at the rate of six percent per
year. Id.
43 Id. § 22-4513(a).
44 Id. §§ 60-2301 to -2303 (1964 & Supp. 1971).
45 The normal exemptions included restrictions on the amount of garnishment, exemption of personal clothing and tools of trade from attachment, and so forth. Id. §§ 60-2304 to
-2311.
46 Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971). Citing In re Allen, 71 Cal. 2d
388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969), and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), the court held that the provision unnecessarily chilled the indigent defendant's
exercise of his right to appointed counsel:
What can be more unnecessary than trying to recoup costs of counsel from an
indvidual already adjudged to be an indigent and by definition unable to stand the
very expense in question? . . .
. .Jnquestionably
U
the reasoning and decision in Gideon would be hollow
verbiage if an indigent accused could be offered or "provided" counsel in such a
way as to assure that he will reject court appointed counsel.
323 F. Supp. at 1233; see notes 28-30 & 41 and accompanying text supra. For discussion of
Strange v. James see 20 KAN. L. REv. 344 (1972).
47 407 U.S. at 134.
48 Id. at 135-37.
49 Id. at 136-37.
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the principle that the equal protection clause "'imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,' "50
the Court held that "[t]his requirement is lacking where . . . the
State has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory
51
conditions of repayment."
II
Fuller v. Oregon
From the perspective of Rinaldi and Strange, decisions in which
the Supreme Court evaded the chill doctrine in right to appointed
counsel cases while adopting an apparently traditional test of equal
protection, Fuller v. Oregon 52 comes as no surprise. In 1972, Prince
Eric Fuller pleaded guilty in an Oregon circuit court to a reduced
charge of third-degree sodomy. Upon his representation that he
was unable to afford retained counsel, an attorney had been appointed to defend him. Fuller was sentenced to five years of
probation. One of the conditions of his probation was that he
reimburse the county for the expense of his attorney and of an
investigator hired by his attorney to gather information for his
53
defense.
The sentencing court imposed this condition on Fuller's probation under the authol-ity of a recoupment statute enacted by the
Oregon legislature in 197 1.54 The carefully-tailored statute outlined a limited set of circumstances in which repayment could be
ordered. First, only costs "specially incurred by the state in pros55
ecuting the defendant" could be the subject of recoupment.
Second, no repayment could be had from an acquitted defendant. 56 Third, no repayment could be had unless at the time of
sentencing the defendant was or would be able to pay.57 Fourth,
5o Id. at 140, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).

5' 407 U.S. at 140.
52 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
53 Id. at 42. The amount of the attorney's fee is not stated in either the Oregon
court or Supreme Court opinion. The investigator's fee was $375. State v. Fuller, 12 Ore.
App. 152, 164, 504 P.2d 1393, 1399 n.2 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
5' ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 161.665-.685 (1973).
55 Id. § 161:665(2). This provision excludes "expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed jury trial .
Id.
56 Id. § 161.665(1).
57 In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take
account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden
that payment of costs will impose.
Id. § 161.665 (3). In Fuller, repayment was actually made by the defendant's fatber, who
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any defendant not in "contumacious default" could have the order
remitted or modified so as to avoid "manifest hardship" to himself
and his immediate family.58 Finally, defaults in payment could be

collected only by the means prescribed by law for the collection of
other judgments.5 9
Fuller appealed from his sentence. His argument took the
form of the familiar dual attack in right to appointed counsel
cases-i.e., that the law had a chilling effect on fundamental rights
and that it denied equal protection to indigent defendants. Fuller's
sentence was affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals in January
1973.60 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 6 1 and
62
in May 1974 it affirmed the judgment of the Oregon court.

A.

The Chill on Fundamental Rights Argument

In upholding the Oregon statute, the Supreme Court was
forced to confront the chill on fundamental rights argument which
it had been able to avoid in Rinaldi and Strange. It is difficult,
however, to conclude that the Fuller Court in fact came to terms
with this argument. Justice Stewart's language in the Court's opinion suggests that the Court was not disposed to recognize as
unconstitutional anything less than a total denial of the right to
appointed counsel:
Oregon's system for providing counsel quite clearly does not
deprive any defendant of the legal assistance necessary to meet
[Gideon's demands]. As the State Court of Appeals observed in
this case, an indigent is entitled to free counsel "when he needs
it"--that is, during every stage of the criminal proceedings
against him ....

The fact that an indigent who accepts state-

agreed to advance funds to his son after the sentencing court commented, "I don't think the
taxpayers of Multnomah County should be saddled with this responsibility where there are
family resources." 12 Ore. App. at 164-65 n.2, 504 P.2d at 1399 n.2 (dissenting opinion). See
notes 77-78 and accompanying text infra.
-8 ORE. REv. STAT. § 161.665 (4) (1973).
59 Id. § 161.685 (6).
60 The state court dismissed both of Fuller's arguments. Chill on constitutional rights
was rejected because of the statute's "substantial limitations" on the power of the sentencing
court. 12 Ore. App. at 159-60, 504 P.2d at 1397. The decision on equal protection grounds
in Strange was said to have had as its "sole basis" Kansas' denial of basic debtor exemptions to
indigent defendants. Id. at 155, 504 P.2d at 1395. In his dissent, Judge Fort followed In re
Allen, 71 Cal. 2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969). See note 41 supra. He also
contended that conditioning probation upon repayment in effect allowed imprisonment for
a debt owed the state, contrary to the Oregon constitution, because failure to repay would be
a parole violation, thus raising the possibility of imprisonment if parole were revoked. 12
Ore. App. at 163, 504 P.2d at 1399; see notes 80-83 and accompanying text infra.
61 414 U.S. 1111 (1973).
62

417 U.S. 40 (1974).
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appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be
required to repay the costs of
these services in no way affects his
63
eligibility to obtain counsel.
This language cannot be reconciled with the chill doctrine as
posited inJackson. Under Jackson the appropriate test for a chilling
effect is not whether the challenged practice deprives anyone of a
fundamental right, or even coerces waiver of a right; it is simply
whether the challenged practice unnecessarily encourages waiver of
the right in question.6 4 The Court did not sufficiently consider
Fuller's argument because it failed to articulate the issue of chill in
the terms set forth in Jackson.6 5 Furthermore, there was particular
" Id. at 52-53 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
64 In his opinion for the Jackson Court, Justice Stewart wrote:
The inevitable effect of any such provision, is, of course, to discourage assertion of
the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial. ....
... The question is not whether the chilling effect is "incidental" rather than
intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore
excessive ....

Given the availability of ...

other alternatives, it is clear that the

selective death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act cannot be
justified ....
... For the evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas
and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them.
390 U.S. at 581-83 (emphasis in original).
There is a temptation to paraphrase Justice Stewart's language in Fuller (see text
accompanying note 63 supra) and to comment that the death penalty provision struck down
inJackson did not deprive any defendant of the right to ajury trial; it did nothing to affect his
eligibility for that to which he was entitled.
Jackson states that chill is unconstitutional when it is "unnecessary." In light of the small
amounts of revenue recovered by recoupment plans, it is difficult to conclude that they are
"necessary." See notes 90-95 and accompanying text infra. Moreover, there is an alternative
means by which states could conserve expenditures for defense services, namely, a restructuring of the system by which the initial determination of eligibility is made. See note 92
infra.
65 Further evidence of the confusion underlying the Fuller Court's treatment ofJackson
is found in the following excerpt from Justice Stewart's opinion:
This case is fundamentally different from our decisions relied on by the
petitioner which have invalidated state and federal laws that placed a penalty on the
exercise of a constitutional right. . . . Unlike the statutes found invalid in those
cases, where the provisions "had no other purpose or effect than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise
them," United States v. Jackson ... [390 U.S.] at 81, Oregon's recoupment statute
merely provides that a convicted person who later becomes able to pay for his counsel
may be required to do so.
417 U.S. at 54 (citations omitted). In this excerpt the Court suggested that a statute with an
ostensibly valid purpose which incidentally chills the exercise of a constitutional right should
be upheld. The Jackson Court had unequivocally rejected such a position. 390 U.S. at 581-83;
see note 64 supra. In Jackson the Court merely stated that "[i]f the provision had no other
purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who
choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional." 390 U.S. at 581.
Chilling laws are not "patently unconstitutional": the objectives which they purport to serve
are permissible. Notwithstanding these objectives, such laws should be struck down if the
chilling effect is "unnecessary." See note 64 supra.

1975]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

reason for the Court to have given this petitioner every "benefit of
the doubt" in testing for chill. In affirming the fundamental
character of the right to appointed counsel, Gideon mandates that
the Court be an uncompromising protector of that right. 66 The
Gideon line of cases also serves to underline the long-established
rule that the Court will indulge every reasonable presumption
67
against waiver of fundamental rights.
Can it fairly be said, in light of the strong presumption against
waiver of fundamental rights, that the Oregon statute does not
encourage waiver of the indigent's right to counsel? 68 One writer
suggests that a recoupment provision which is consistent with
notions of fair notice must be inconsistent with the principle of
knowing and voluntary waiver:
If, when counsel is offered, the defendant is told that he may
later be required to pay the fee, it may discourage him from
accepting the offer, especially if he is already ignorant or dubious about the value of having counsel. It is questionable, however, that a waiver can be completely voluntary when a defendant who accepts counsel knows that he may be charged with a
fee the amount and terms of which are to be fixed at a later time.... On
the other hand, if the defendant is not told of the collection
system at the time counsel is first offered, he may feel that the
court played a trick on him by persuading him to accept the
offer when he would
have declined it had he known about the
69
possible expense.
Thus, even a carefully-tailored recoupment scheme thrusts the
indigent criminal defendant into a state of considerable uncertainty. Concurring in the Fuller Court's opinion, Justice Douglas considered this uncertainty to be no different from that which a
16 [I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him. ... The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
6s Justice Marshall, in his dissent, found it unnecessary to reach Fuller's chill argument,
pointing out that
such a claim could more appropriately be considered by this Court in the context
of an actual case involving a defendant who, unlike petitioner, had refused
appointed counsel and contended that his refusal was not a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights because it was based upon his fear of bearing
the burden of a debt for appointed counsel or upon his failure to understand the
limitations the State imposes on such a debt.
417 U.S. at 61 n.2. The fact that the Court went out of its way to reject Fuller's chill
argument underlines the importance of Fuller as an indicator of the Court's currently
prevailing approach to right to counsel cases.
" 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 113 (emphasis added).
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nonindigent defendant faces in deciding whether or not to retain
counsel. 70 But the analogy fails for two reasons. First, it does not
acknowledge that the indigent defendant's apprehension is accentuated by his likely ignorance of financial and legal matters.71
Second, it presumes equal degrees of uncertainty. In practice, the
nonindigent defendant may intelligently predict the financial consequences of his retaining counsel: he hires the lawyer in the first
instance, negotiates the fee, and approves expenditures for ancillary services. The indigent defendant, on the other hand, is not
privy to the transactions in which the extent of his potential liability
is determined. When he chooses to have counsel he in effect signs a
"blank check." The knowledge that the "check" will be "cashed"
only if it is later determined that he is able to pay does little to
dispel the indigent defendant's apprehension. 72
It is difficult to distinguish an order to repay defense costs
from a fine,7 3 especially where the state compels repayment, as
does Oregon, only from defendants found guilty.7 4 By refusing to
waive appointed counsel, the indigent defendant runs the risk of
incurring additional punishment,7 5 in the form of a repayment
76
order, should he be convicted.
Very often, counsel is appointed to defend an indigent defendant whose relatives possess some resources. The relatives may
have been unwilling to come forward, or the defendant may be
70 417 U.S. at 56 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71 "As a practical matter ... most indigent defendants may not be in a position to know

adequately the consequences of waiver." Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 27 (1963) (footnote
omitted).
72 Recoupment schemes generally afford the defendant no hearing on the matter of
repayment prior to entry of the repayment order. In United States v. Durka, 490 F.2d 478
(7th Cir. 1973), it was held that failure to afford a hearing before entry of a repayment
order does not constitute a violation of due process. In order to assert his defenses, a
defendant must disobey the order and assert them at the resulting contempt or parole
revocation proceeding. Id. at 480. In choosing this course of action, a defendant thus takes a
substantial risk of receiving additional punishment.
The Fuller Court did not have to consider notice and hearing claims because they
apparently were not raised in the state court. 417 U.S. at 50 n.11. It noted "in passing,"
however, that Oregon provided hearings before levying of execution or revocation of
probation. Id. This appears to be tacit approval of the holding in Durka.
7' Indeed, the Oregon recoupment provision is found in the state criminal code.
74 The Court itself made the comparison of costs to a fine when it reiterated its prior
belief that there is no "'constitutional infirmity in imprisonment of a defendant with the
means to pay a fine who refuses or neglects to do so.'" 417 U.S. at 53 n.12, quoting Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400 (1971).
75 Moreover, the additional punishment falls unequally. See text accompanying note 92
infra.
76 Cf United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968).
77 There is no legal obligation for relatives to come forward in this situation, other than
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reluctant to seek or to accept their help. The knowledge that, if he
chooses to have counsel, pressure might later be exerted on family
members to "lend" him funds with which to repay the costs of his
defense certainly encourages such a defendant to waive his
7
rights.
B.

The Equal Protection Argument

In passing on Fuller's equal protection claims, the Supreme
Court compared Oregon's treatment of indigent criminal defendants ordered to repay defense costs with its treatment of
other civil judgment debtors and of indigent criminal defendants
not ordered to repay. It distinguished Strange on the ground
that Oregon did not explicitly deprive defendants like Fuller of
normal debtor exemptions.7 9 In his dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Brennan joined, Justice Marshall accused the majority of
obfuscating the equal protection issue by focusing solely on the
matter of civil debtor exemptions. He argued that Oregon's treatment of indigent criminal defendants ordered .to repay was unequal in a more fundamental respect. Although the Oregon constitution forbids the imprisonment of recalcitrant civil debtors, 8 0
the recoupment statute's authorization of probation contingent
upon repayment means that indigent defendants in debt to the
state for defense costs may be threatened with imprisonment. 8 1
under the rule that, insofar as legal services are "necessaries," a father is liable for expenses
incurred by his child, Gerston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
and a husband is liable for expenses incurred by his wife, Elder v. Rosenwasser, 238 N.Y.
427, 144 N.E. 669 (1924).
The following excerpt suggests another aspect of the problem:
It would seem that... there is a certain unfairness in placing pressures on parents
or relatives to retain counsel. The result might well be that the defendant whose
relatives were "callous" would be represented by a better lawyer than the defendant whose relatives were sympathetic and conscientious. And the better lawyer will
be provided at state expense.
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 71, at 20 n.94.
78 The circumstances under which Fuller's father "lent" his son the funds for repayment have already been described. See note 57 supra. The dissenting judge in the Oregon
court felt that the statutory scheme exerted "inhibiting" pressures on family members. 12
Ore. App. at 163-64, 504 P.2d at 1399 (Fort J., dissenting). The elder Fuller did not come
forward with funds at any time before his son's sentencing. Would his son, faced with a
sodomy charge, have elected counsel had he known that his father might later be called
upon to repay the cost?
79 417 U.S. at 47-48.
80 ORE. CONST. art. I, § 19.
81 417 U.S. at 59-61. Justice Marshall, dissenting, observed:
Artide I § 19 of the Oregon Constitution is representative of a fundamental state
policy consistent with the modern rejection of the practice of imprisonment for debt as
unnecessarily cruel and essentially counterproductive. Since Oregon chooses not to
provide imprisonment for debt for well-heeled defendants who do not pay their
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The majority perceived the imprisonment for debt issue not as one
of equal protection, but as an issue of state law not before the
Court. 82 Nevertheless, it went out of its way to countenance the
practice by approving Oregon's contention that "revocation of
probation is not a collection device used by the State to enforce
debts to it, but a sanction imposed for 'an intentional refusal to
obey the order of the Court.' "83
Oregon demanded no repayment from indigent criminal defendants found not guilty,8 4 nor from those who were convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment. 85 The "traditional" character of
the equal protection test employed by the Fuller Court is apparent
in the Court's discussion of these classifications. Citing Rinaldi, the
Court stated that its task was "merely to determine whether there is
'some rationality in the nature of the class singled out'" as potential
debtors.86 Its conclusion was that "Oregon could surely decide with
objective rationality" that indigent defendants who are convicted
must repay, while those indigent defendants who similarly benefit
87
from state expenditures but are acquitted need not.
Even conceding the appropriateness of the use in Fuller of a
"traditional" equal protection test, it may be argued that the
Court's conclusion that the Oregon statute is not violative of equal
protection was unsound. The "traditional" test of equal protection,
as set forth in Rinaldi, relates not to abstract or hypothetical notions
of rationality, but to the rationality of the challenged classification
in relation to the legislative object involved. 8 8
Insofar as the legitimate end of recoupment statutes is the
replenishment of the treasury "from the pockets of those who have
directly benefitted" from public expenditures,8 9 and not the heaping of additional punishment upon convicted indigents, the rationality of a distinction between convicted and acquitted indigent
retained counsel, I do not believe it can, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,
imprison an indigent defendant for his failure to pay the costs of his appointed
counsel.
Id. at 60-61.
82 Id. at 48 n.9.
83Id., quoting ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.685(2) (1973).
84 See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
85 Presumably, it is only the convict sentenced to probation who has any earning
capacity with which to make repayment. D. OAKS, supra note 3, at 58. Prison pay might
suffice for a transcript, as in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), but it could scarcely pay
a lawyer's fee.
86 417 U.S. at 49, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).
87 417 U.S. at 50.
8 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
89 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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defendants must be questioned. Quite apart from this point, it is
difficult to conclude that recoupment statutes actually accomplish
the end of fiscal replenishment. Nearly all of the defendants who
are found to be indigent at the time counsel is appointed but are
later found able to make repayment may be placed in one of the
following three groups: (1) those who acquired assets during the
criminal proceeding through gift, inheritance, loan, or other
sources; (2) those who were initially found to be indigent because
of their concealment of resources which were later discovered; and
(3) those "marginally eligible" defendants whose finances remained
stable, but who were determined to be below the indigency line for
purposes of appointment of counsel, and later determined to be
above it for purposes of repayment.
Studies of various legal defense programs yield several observations about these three groups. The first group appears to be so
small as to be insignificant. 90 The second is also small. Concealment
of assets is less common than might be supposed, and under the
present system of determining eligibility, those who do conceal
assets usually go undetected. 9 1 The burden of the recoupment
scheme thus falls almost entirely on the "marginally eligible" defendants who comprise tHe third group. 92 But this group is not
large either,9 3 and its members are the one group of criminal
D. OAKS, supra note 3, at 58.
91 There are two reasons why concealment usually goes undetected. First, investigation
90

would require "huge time and expense." Id. at 40. Second, the one officer of the court who is
in a position to know of the concealment, namely the appointed attorney himself, may,
because of the attorney-client privilege, be reluctant to reveal this information. Id. at 7, 47.
Insofar as catching those who misrepresent eligibility is a goal of recoupment statutes,
this goal goes unmet. A solution to the problem awaits an overhauling of the system for
determining eligibility in the first instance. See note 92 infra.
92 Ironically, it was a goal of the federal recoupment statute and perhaps of others to
extend assistance to "marginally eligible" defendants. See note 39 supra. It seems that such
defendants are either being held ineligible or being granted aid subject to burdensome
conditions of repayment. This problem suggests that the cursory character of the intitial
determination of eligibility is the cause of many of the defects in indigent defense systems.
The following observation is typical:
The determination is made either by a magistrate at the first appearance before
him or by the district judge at the arraignment stage, the only difference of... note
being that some magistrates do not put the accused under oath.
All judges question the accused in open court-and that is about all.
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 71, at 19-20. Like the initial determination of eligibility, the
determination of who shall repay and in what amount is based upon a procedure so
irregular and discretionary as to raise questions of due process.
" Protessor Oaks concluded from his study that in federal courts the determination of
eligibility in most cases is easy: "As a statistical matter, the typical defendant who seeks
assistance under the act is unemployed and has no cash or other property." D. OAKS, supra
note 3, at 27.
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defendants for whom the threat of potential future liability is most
intimidating. Moreover, because of their financial conditions, the
amounts which may ultimately be recovered from them are not
94
great.
Weighing heavily against the slight value of recoupment
schemes as a means of recovering public expenditures is their
undesirable influence on indigent defendants and on the entire
rehabilitative process. 95 Under a "traditional" equal protection test,
therefore, one element of which is a "balancing" of interests, 9 6 the
rationality of the Oregon system's relation to the goal of fiscal
replenishment seems tenuous. 97 Under "strict scrutiny" analysis,
which arguably is called for in defense cost recoupment cases
because of the nature of the right involved and the class affected,
the case against the Oregon system is an even clearer one.
III
Fuller v. Oregon

AND THE CURRENTLY-PREVAILING

APPROACH IN RIGHT TO COUNSEL CASES

The tendency to read too much into a case of recent vintage
should be avoided. This caveat is especially applicable to a case like
Fuller, where the statute involved is highly specific98 and the
petitioner is not the "ideal" challenger of the state practice. 99
94 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115. The author argues that

it is more importaut for society to defray the cost of providing an adequate defense
in criminal cases (a constitutional obligation) than to subsidize the civil court system
by charging only nominal fees to litigants.
Id.
95 The effects of recoupment systems on the efficiency of the probation apparatus have
been the subject of considerable study:
Although the stringent requirements of compulsive repayment might constantly
remind [the probationer] of his past mistake and thus "make a better man of him,"
it might well be that the financial hardship imposed would affect adversely rehabilitation by, for example, embittering the probationer who views this use of probation
as extortion or threatened imprisonment for deht.
Kamisar & Choper, supra note 71, at 26.
"It has been reported that, in Michigan, the use of this system in all cases has produced
the result 'that the rehabilitative aspects of their probation program have badly deteriorated,
with the probation officers becoming mere collection agents.' 22 CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM
COMM. REP. 103 (1961)." Kamisar & Choper,supra note 71, at 26 n. 114 (emphasis in original).

" See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
97 Contrary to the insistence of the Court in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), that
the efficiency of a recoupment scheme has no bearing on its constitutionality, the failure of
such a scheme to fulfill its goal surely has bearing on the issue of its rational relation to the
legitimate end involved. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
98 See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
' See note 68 supra.
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Nevertheless, the importance of Fuller as an indicator of current
trends is unmistakable, for it signifies what Rinaldi and Strange
presaged: the Court's refusal to apply, whether by means of the
chill doctrine or through "strict scrutiny" equal protection, an
analysis of current right to counsel issues which would emphasize
the fundamental nature of the right involved.
Support for the conclusions drawn from Fuller can be found in
a case decided by the Supreme Court less than one month after the
Fuller decision. In Ross v. Moffit,10 0 the Court reversed a unanimous decision of the Fourth Circuit' 01 and held that the right of
indigent criminal defendants to appointed counsel does not extend
to discretionary appeals at the state level or to applications for
review by the United States Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, distinguished Gideon and its fundamental
rights rationale on the ground that the appellate process, unlike
the trial stage, is initiated by the defendant, rather than by the
state. 10 2 He further asserted that no fundamental right of the
individual vis-4-vis the state was involved in Moffitt because "[u]nfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State and
denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their
poverty."' 0 3 Thus, concluded Justice Rehnquist, the issue in Moffitt
"is more profitably considered under an equal protection
' 04
analysis."'
In his opinion for the court of appeals, Chief Judge
Haynsworth had written that there is "no logical basis for differentiation between appeals of right and permissive review procedures
in the context of the Constitution and the right to counsel."' 10 5 But
the Supreme Court took a different view of the equal protection
issue in Moffitt. Given the "last resort" nature of discretionary
appeal and the availability of counsel at intermediate appellate
levels, 10 6 the Court held that it is reasonable for a state to find that
"other claims for public funds ...preclude the implementation" of
a system to provide counsel for indigent criminal defendants
07
seeking discretionary review of their convictions.1
100 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
101483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
102 417 U.S. at 610.
103 Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
104

Id.

105483 F.2d at 653.
106 417 U.S. at 613-15.
107 Id. at 618.
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CONCLUSION

In right to appointed counsel cases the pendulum has clearly
swung away from expansionism. Although the Supreme Court
seems to have stifled the egalitarian spirit of the landmark right to
counsel cases of the 1960's, it shows no sign of a willingness to
retreat from the rules of law established therein. The gains won by
indigent criminal defendants will be lost not in the Supreme Court,
but in the state legislatures. Future legislation affecting the right to
appointed counsel will, as did the Fuller recoupment provision,
come before a Court which holds a tolerant attitude toward legislative choices in this area.
Paul K. Stecker

